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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON: TESTIMONY USING A
COMPUTER PRINTOUT OF RESULTS OF A BLOOD
SAMPLE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE BECAUSE SUCH RESULTS ARE NOT
STATEMENTS OF THE LAB TECHNICIANS WHO RAN THE
TESTS, ARE NOT HEARSAY STATEMENTS, AND ARE NOT
TESTIMONIAL.
By: Melyssa Polen
In United States v. Washington, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that computer printouts of the results of a
blood sample are not statements of the lab technicians who ran the
tests, are not hearsay statements, and are not testimonial. United States
v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, a qualified
third party may testify using the computer printout results without
violating the Confrontation Clause or the hearsay rule. Id. at 227.
Dwonne Washington ("Washington") was pulled over shortly after
3:30 am on January 3, 2004, by a United States Park Police officer,
Officer Hatch, who was patrolling the Baltimore-Washington
Parkway. Washington was going thirty miles per hour in a fifty-five
mile per hour zone when Officer Hatch turned on his siren and lights
to pull Washington over.
Instead of complying, Washington
accelerated and decelerated, pulled off onto the shoulder and then
pulled back onto the road, and continued to meander along the
parkway with Officer Hatch pursuing his vehicle. Finally, another
park police officer maneuvered his car in front of Washington's,
forcing him to stop. When Washington did not respond to Officer
Hatch's commands to show his hands or open his car door, he was
removed from the car, placed in handcuffs, and asked basic questions
to which he did not respond. Based on Washington's unresponsive
demeanor and an odor of phencyclidine ("PCP"), Officer Hatch took
Washington to a hospital where he agreed to give a blood sample for
testing. The blood sample was sent to the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology for analysis of ethanol and other drugs.
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The blood sample was subjected to "headspace gas
chromatography" to check for ethanol and "immunoassay or
chromatography" to check for amphetamines, barbiturates,
benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, and phencyclidine.
These tests were conducted by three lab technicians operating under
the protocols and supervision of Dr. Barry Levine ("Dr. Levine"),
director of the lab and chief toxicologist. Using the raw data and
graphs produced by the testing instruments, Dr. Levine issued a report
stating that Washington's blood contained ethanol ("alcohol") and
PCP. Based on this report, Washington was charged with driving
under the influence, unsafe operation of a vehicle, and other Class B
misdemeanors.
At trial, Washington objected to Dr. Levine's testimony as an
expert witness regarding the results of the blood test. Washington
argued that he was entitled to confront the lab technicians who
conducted the actual testing, and that Dr. Levine's testimony was
inadmissible hearsay. Washington's objections were overruled by a
magistrate judge, and Washington was found guilty and sentenced to
sixty days in prison. The ruling was affirmed by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt, and
Washington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.
On appeal, Washington argued that the computer-generated reports
were "testimonial statements" of the lab technicians. Id. at 229. He
objected to their hearsay statements being admitted by way of Dr.
Levine's testimony, and argued that Levine's testimony was a
violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause not to have the
technicians in court for cross-examination. Id. The Fourth Circuit
noted that while the Confrontation Clause requires that all criminal
defendants be able to confront witnesses against them, a "witness" for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause is defined as a declarant who
made a "testimonial statement." Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004». In this case the "statements" were not made by
any person, but by the machines which ran the blood tests.
Washington, 498 F.3d at 230. The only testimony the technicians
could have offered was that the test results showed that Washington's
blood contained PCP and alcohol. Id. at 229-30. Since Dr. Levine
was merely offering the same conclusions based on the test results, the
Confrontation Clause was not violated. Id. at 230.
Further, the Court pointed out that since the lab technicians did not
make statements about whether the blood sample was positive for
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alcohol or PCP, there would be no value in cross-examining them as
they would only be able to refer to the same printouts Dr. Levine
referred to in his testimony. Id. The Court noted that while
Washington did not raise any concerns about the reliability of the
machine or the chain of custody, such concerns were valid, but should
be addressed through the process of authentication, not by a hearsay or
Confrontation Clause analysis. Id. at 231.
The Court elaborated on the point that statements made by
machines "are not out-of-court statements made by declarants that are
subject to the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 230. They looked to the
definition of "statement" in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), and
found that the "statement" offered by the machine was made
independent of human observation or reporting, and that only the
machine, not the technicians, could provide facts about the chemical
composition of Washington's blood. Washington, 498 F.3d at 230.
They further determined that the test results could not be hearsay
because hearsay requires an out-of-court declarant, and Federal Rule
of Evidence 80 I (b) defines a declarant as a "person" who makes a
statement. Washington, 498 F .3d at 231. Thus, because the data from
the machines did not constitute testimonial hearsay statements, Dr.
Levine's testimony using the data was not in violation of the
Confrontation Clause or hearsay rule, and was properly admitted at
trial. Id. at 232.
The dissent argued that although the test results were computergenerated, a substantial amount of human input is required and the
technicians must be highly trained. Id. at 232-33 (Michael, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the technicians must follow a specific
procedure which is subject to human error, and thus the test results
"must be considered statements of the laboratory technicians for both
evidentiary and Confrontation Clause purposes." Id. at 233-34.
Furthermore, courts in other jurisdictions have consistently considered
computer printouts to be hearsay statements admissible only under one
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. at 234 (citing United States v.
Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993) (computer printouts of
lensometer readings); United States v. McKinney, 631 F.2d 569 (8th
Cir. 1980) (blood test results); United States v. DeWater, 846 F.2d 528
(9th Cir. 1988) (breathalyzer test result)). The majority responded to
these arguments by noting that the dissent was mixing authentication
issues with its argument about "statements" and observed that if the
defendant wished to raise questions about how the machines had been
set up, he was entitled to subpoena the lab technicians into court and
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cross-examine them. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231 n.3 (majority
opinion). The dissent also suggested that the lab test results were
testimonial because their purpose was to establish or prove a past
event that was relevant to later criminal prosecution. ld. at 234-35
(Michael, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent felt that the decision to
confront the lab technicians should have been one for the defendant,
not the court, to make. ld. at 235.
The holding in this case will make it easier for litigants to introduce
computer-generated results because such results will not be considered
hearsay statements. However, as noted in the dissent, this result is at
odds with other circuits. Therefore, unless and until the United States
Supreme Court addresses this issue, it seems that defendants in
Maryland's federal courts will be unable to confront those who
directly conduct computer-generated tests. Defendants must raise the
issue in terms of the reliability of the test, or handling or chain of
custody of the sample. This ruling will also allow for any expert to
interpret the results of a test, regardless of whether they actually
conducted the test. Further, with the increasing importance of DNA
tests and the development of new and novel scientific methods which
can be used to evaluate evidence, the use of computer-generated tests
at trials is certain to increase. Whether these tests are "testimonial"
statements, and whether the machines or their operators may be
considered "declarants" are issues which will surely develop, and
which should be closely followed by practitioners.

